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June  1988 Abstract 
Sources  of Waqe  Dispersion: 
The  Contribution of  Interemployer Differentials Within Industry 
Labor  economists'  current focus on  the effect of long-run  labor-supply 
factors on  wages  leaves  unexplained more  than half of wage  variation.  This 
paper  examines  whether  differences apparently associated with demand  may 
increase our  ability to  explain earnings. 
In  BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys,  establishment-based  wage  differentials 
(control 1  ing for occupation)  paid to  bl  ue-coll ar employees  account  for 20-70 
percent of within-industry wage  variation.  This  corresponds  to  a standard 
deviation in  wages  of  11  percent of the mean,  almost  as  large  'as  wage 
variation among  two-digit industries,  and  a large portion of the economywide 
standard deviation of wages  of about  50  percent. 
Upon  investigation,  the occupation  classifications appear  sufficiently 
narrow to  reject the possibility that establishments  are  simply  sorted by 
education,  tenure,  or age.  Furthermore,  since at least half of wage  variation 
among  employers  is linked to  characteristics such  as  union affiliation,  size, 
product,  technology,  and  method  of  pay,  these differentials are not random. 
Finally,  the evidence  is  inconsistent with strong versions of compensating 
differentials models,  These  findings underscore  the need  for further research 
into models  of efficiency wages,  bargaining over  rents,  and  systematic  sorting 
by  unmeasured  worker  ability. Introduction 
Are  employers  active participants or passive price takers in  the labor 
market?  Currently,  most  empirical  labor  economics  studies  focus on  education 
and  experience (that is,  long-run labor  supply,  as  introduced in  Becker  119641 
and  Mincer  C19741)  to the extent  that the variation left unexplained  in  wage 
equations  (well over half of the total) is ascribed to  unobserved human 
capital or  random  error. 
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In  the 1940s  and  1950s,  the administration of wage  and  price controls  led 
economists  to  examine  employer  wage  policies (that is,  labor demand,  see  Segal 
C19811  and  Kerr  C19831).2  Recent  research on  industry wage  effects 
forceful ly  documents  the exi  stence  and  correlates of industry wage 
differentials,  and  challenges  the assumption  that wage  variation between 
industries reflects only human  capital differences,  but remains  inconclusive 
as  to the source  of the differentials (see  summary  in  Dickens  and  Katz  C19861). 
However,  industry is not uniquely defined;  sources  of variation between 
industries should affect wages  within industry as  well.  Interindustry studies 
neglect within-industry sources  of  wage  variation that do  not vary much  among 
industries (for example,  size of  establishment,  Brown  and  Medoff  C19871). 
In  an  analysis of variance of individual production workers'  wages  within 
and  between  establishments,  this paper  shows  that,  controlling for detailed 
occupation,  wage  variations among  employers  are almost  as  large as  the 
variations among  industries.  In  fact, occupation and  establishment  identity 
alone can  explain 90  percent of  wage  variation among  blue-collar workers. 
The  paper  then performs  a variety of tests for the consistency of the 
findings  with simple  explanations of establishment differentials.  The  data 
include detailed job classification and  sex,  but no other standard measure  of human  capital.  Thus,  the results are tested for whether  the classifications 
are  sufficiently detailed to  capture most  productive differences due  to 
education,  experience,  and  tenure.  The  possibility that employer 
differentials compensate  for undesirable  conditions of  employment  is  also 
evaluated.  Then,  the differentials are tested for evidence of nonrandomness. 
Finally,  some  alternative explanations are discussed. 
Thus,  this paper  establishes  that employer  wage  differentials are a large, 
neglected portion of wage  variation that merit continuing research.  The  wage 
differentials investigated here accrue,  on average,  to  all employees  at an 
establishment;  they are coefficients on establishment dummies,  controlling for 
occupation.  The  dependent  variable is  earnings of  blue-collar workers  in  six 
manufacturing industries,  net of  fringes and  overtime and  shift premia. 
Although certainly well within the topic of employer  differentials, 
differences between  the public and  private sectors,  between manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing  industries,  and  between  blue-collar and  white-collar 
employees  are beyond  the scope  of this work.3 
I. Empirical Literature on Employer  Waqe  Effects Within Industry 
Previous  studies of  employer  wage  effects strongly suggest  the existence 
of within-occupation interemployer differentials,  but do not document  their 
existence in  the United States.  The  few U.S.  studies have  focused on a single 
aspect of interemployer  differences (such  as  plant size),  or on one  occupation 
or city, rather than on estimating the importance  of the whole  differential 
across  many  occupations,  as  this study does.  For  a more  detailed review of 
the  theoretical and  empi ri  cal  1  i  terature,  see  Groshen  (1  988a). Two U.S.  case studies find significant differentials between firms, making 
use of unusually rich information on both worker and firm characteristics. 
Reynolds (1951 1 concludes that firms select the general  wage level  on which 
they operate until  forced to change.  Rees and Schultz (1970) estimate 
individual and establishment effects on wages for four groups of  occupations 
and find systematic differences between firms that are not entirely consistent 
across all  occupations. 
Mackay, et a1 .  (1  971  1,  No1  an and Brown  (1 9831, and  Brown, et a1 .  (1 9841, 
are recent case studies of English and Australian labor markets.  Although the 
techniques used are different, their results are similar to  those presented  in 
this paper:  plant differentials are a large and fundamental component of wage 
dispersion.  And, they are persistent over time and linked to plant 
performance.  Hodson  (1983)  matches U.S.  survey data with employer information 
and finds employer characteristics to be strongly significant predictors of 
wages, controlling for standard human capital  measures. 
Ward  (1  980) and Van Gi  ezen (  1982) suggest that a1  though  i nteroccupational 
differentials are somewhat compressed within establishments, establishment 
effects are fairly uniform across occupations.  Other support for the probable 
existence of  establishment effects comes from studies of  the relationship 
between wages and particular establishment differences  (for  example, employer 
size, Brown and Medoff 119871, and  proportion female, Blau  C19771). 
11.  Microeconomic Sources of  Wage Differentials Between Employers 
Groshen (1988a) reviews the features of several  theories that explain the 
apparent existence of  employer differentials, by taking into account factors 
costly to  the employer-worker relationship.  Thi  s section introduces the nature of the puzzle and  the three simplest solutions. 
Under  perfect competition in  capital and  labor markets,  equivalent workers 
at equivalent  jobs earn the same  wage.  Employers  whose  wages  stray from the 
market  rate (that  is,  from the horizontal  supply  curve)  will be  forced out of 
business by  loss of employees  (wages  set too low)  or capital  (wages  set too 
high).  Variations in  labor demand  should affect only quantity hired,  never 
wages,  so  long as  worker  utility is  unaffected. 
The  possible existence of employer  wage  differentials raises two 
questions:  (1  what  motivates one  employer  to  pay  more  than another? and,  (2) 
how  do high-wage  employers  stay in  business?  If productivity differentials 
are invoked as  answers,  they must  be  due  to traits of individuals (not 
employers),  implying the need  for more  explanation (that  is,  a reason for 
sorting).  If productivity differentials are not the answer,  then costly 
information  or imperfect competition  in  the product market  must  be  present  and 
operate on  all employees  of an  establishment similarly. 
Sorting by Ability.  The  first  model  relaxes  the assumption  of  uniform 
productivity among  workers.  However,  in  order  to  generate establishment 
differentials rather than  just individual differentials,  the  theories must 
explain why  the marginal  product of workers  varies by  employer.  The  reason 
for such  segregation by establishment may  be  'jobs as  dam  sites'  (Akerlof 
C1981 I),  the abi 1 i  ty-sensi  tive technology  (Roy  C1951 I),  the  sociology of  team 
productivity as  a function of team  uniformity,  or differences in  the age  of 
establ i  shments  (reflected in  average  experience of employees).  In  a1 1 
versions,  a1 1 employers  (whether  high-wage  or low),  earn zero or equal  profits 
in  equilibrium.  They  maximize  profits by  sorting;  they avoid hiring or 
retaining workers  less productive than their existing work  force. Compensating Differentials  Wages  will mismeasure  the total return to 
working if they include differentials to  compensate  workers  for extra 
nonpecuniary  costs of their employment  (Smith  C17761 and  Smith  C19791). 
Employer  (rather  than individual) differentials arise when  quality of  working 
conditions is  consistent across  all or most  of the work  force in 
establishments.  Although many  standard examples  (for example,  dirt  or 
physical  exertion)  do not apply,  high risk of layoff,  poor  ventilation,  fringe 
benefits,  personnel  treatment,  or location could presumably  affect all or most 
workers  in  an  establishment.  Then,  the costs of improvement of these 
/ 
conditions must  vary enough  among  plants to  generate  large differentials. 
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Random  Variations.  Finally, if search  is expensive  for job-seekers  or 
firms,  the marketplace can  sustain a range of wages  because  the gain from 
further search becomes  uncertain,  rather than a known  quanti  ty (Sti  gl  er  C19621 
and  Rothschi  ld  and  Stigl  i  tz E19761).  Distributions of wages  are  sustainable 
only if the minimum  wage  paid differs from the mean  offer by  less than  search 
costs.  Lagged  adjustment  to  labor market  conditions  (Dunlop  C19821)  provides 
6  a mechanism  that generates  random  wage  variations.  However, if  employer 
differentials  are  large,  long-lived,  or associated  systematically with 
characteristics of  employers,  they are probably not random  variations. 
111.  An  Analysis of Variance of Wages 
1  .  The  Appl i  cation of  ANOVA  to  Wages 
The  following equation forms  the basis of most  recent empirical  labor 
economics  wage  research  (following Mincer  C19741): where  wk  =  ln(wage)  for individual k, 
p =  intercept, 
Zk  =  vector of demographic  characteristics (age,  schooling,  etc.), 
v  =  vector of coefficients of (returns  to  having)  demographic 
characteristics,  and 
E~  =  randomly  distributed error term. 
If  virtually all productive differences in  human  capital are between,  not 
within,  narrowly defined occupations  (section  IV  examines  this issue further), 
occupation dummies  capture all significant differences in  human  capital  (and 
working conditions)  among  occupations.  The  index i can  be  introduced for 
occupation i  , so  that k  denotes  the k9  individual  in  occupation i  .  Then 
let Xi  be  a vector of  occupational  dummies,  with u as  the vector of 
occupation differentials,  yielding the following equation: 
The  test for the importance of  differences associated with the demand  side 
is to  estimate  the contribution of employer  variables included in  a wage 
equation with supply-side  variables,  as  follows: 
where  w  =  ln(wage> of  employee  k in  occupation i at employer  j  , 
Yj  =  vector of  employer  j's characteristics (industry,  size,  etc.), 
or a vector of  establishment  dummy  variables, 
D  =  vector of coefficients of (returns  to  working for) the employer, 
XIYj  =  interaction between  occupation i and  characteristics of 
employer  j  , and 
y  =  vector of returns to  occupation i  working for employer  j. 
If  wages  are at all dependent  on  employer  characteristics,  the omission of 
employer  variables diminishes the ability of the model  to  explain wage variation,  and  biases estimates of coefficients on  individual characteristics 
correlated with place of employment.  To  measure  the full impact of employer 
differentials on  wage  variation,  the first  results presented  set Y  equal  to  a 
vector of establishment dummies.  Thus,  equation  (3)  can  be  rewritten and 
wages  may  be  understood  as  the sum  of a series of differentials: 
where  a,, B,,  and  yl  are the i*, jG,  and  ij~  elements  of 
the a,  B,  and  y vectors,  respectively,  and  p is the overall mean  wage. 
The  interaction of  occupation and  establishment is the group of workers 
I 
holding the same  occupation at the same  plant.  In  this paper,  this wi  11  be 
cal  led an  employee's  "work-group."  These  differential  s can  be  understood as 
follows: 
1) Occupation differential (al) is  an  occupation's average  deviation 
from  mean  wages,  across  all establishments.  Presumably,  these premia reflect 
productivity and  compensating differences among  occupations. 
2) Establishment  differential (BJ) is the employees'  average  deviation 
from occupation mean  in  an  establishment,  across  all occupations.  Thus,  these 
encompass  many  differentials proposed  in  earlier research:  size of employer, 
industry,  percentage female,  union,  etc. 
3)  Work-group  (interaction)  differential  (ylJ) is  paid to  a particular 
work  grow above  the occu~ation  and  establishment differentials.  High 
variance in  this term indicates  significantly different internal wage 
structures among  employers. 
4)  Within work-group  (individual)  differential  is  an  individual 
or residual deviation from the mean  for an  occupation in  an  establishment, 
presumably  the result of individual productivity or tenure differences or 
differing compensation  strategies on  the part of employers  (for example, 
incentive vs.  day  rates).  The  more  that wages  are tied to  individuals rather 
than to jobs,  the larger is this component. 
Note  that equations  (3) and  (4)  express  the same  model,  in  slightly 
different notation.  If the differentials in  equation (4) are mutually independent,  analysis of variance  (ANOVA)  will partition the total variance of 
wages  as  follows: 
The  relative size of each  variance component  estimate indicates its 
relative economic  importance  more  clearly than would  a table of coefficient 
estimates  for each  occupation,  each  establishment  and  each  work-group.  Our 
interest is  the economic  and  statistical significance of the differentials as 
groups,  summarized  by  the relative sizes of the variance components,  as 
fol  lows : 
1  )  a:  measures  the  importance  of external  occupational  1 abor markets, 
2) oi measures  the  impact  of employer  differences on  wage  determination, 
3)  a
2  measures  the  independence  of internal  labor markets,  and  Y  4) u,  measures  the  importance  of worker  differences within work-group. 
Differing relative sizes of the components  suggest  very different views  of 
the  functioning of the labor market.  Table  1 lists eight possible conclusions 
from ANOVA  (all allowing for individual variation)  and  summarizes  their 
implications for economic  wage  determination models.  The  analysis in  this 
paper  uses  model  8  to  test for  the other  seven  models. 
The  essential  complication to  the discussion above  is  that variance 
component  decomposition  as  shown  in  equation  (5)  is  not straightforward when 
data are unbalanced.  An  unbalanced  design produces  multicollinearity between 
the  vectors of dummy  variables  (Xi  and  Y,)  in  equation (31,  which prevents 
a  simple separation of the impacts of X and  Y.  If an  establishment  employs  a 
relatively large number  of workers  in  a  skilled occupation,  we  cannot 
distinguish whether  a differential paid to  those workers  is  due  to  their 
employer  or to  their occupation. The  ANOVA  technique applied is  a decomposition of the sum  of squares  of 
wages  (rather  than a variance  components  estimation),  because  the correct 
number  of degrees  of freedom is unidentified in  an  unbalanced  design.'  This 
technique  expl  ici  tly  estimates  the ambiguity  arising from design imbalance. 
The  summary  of the  technique  provided in table 2  shows  how  a series of  own 
least squares  (OLS)  regressions  is used  to  partition the  sum  of  squares  of 
wages  into components  corresponding  to  those  shown  in  equation  (5) by noting 
the changes  in  the coefficient of determination (that is,  sum  of squares 
explained as  a proportion of total).  Use  of the  R
2  standardizes  o; 
to  a value of  one,  across  industries.  First,  log wages  are regressed on 
vectors of occupation and  establ i  shment  dummies,  each  separately.  Then  they 
are both included in  an  equation (called the full main-effects model).  The 
marginal  contribution of each  to  the full main-effects model  (over  the 
equation with the other one  alone)  measures  the portion of  wage  variation 
associated unambiguously  with that factor.  These  correspond  to  minimum 
estimates  of the relative size of the variance contributed by  occupation and 
establishment differentials,  or o:  and  0;.  The  difference 
between  the R
2  of  each  set of dummies  in the equation alone and  its  marginal 
contribution to  the full main-effects equation is  a measure  of  the "joint" 
(coll i  near,  or ambiguous)  explanatory power  of  occupation and  establ i  shment. 
The  relative contribution of work-group  differentials (a;)  is 
measured  by  the difference between  the explanatory power  of  the regression on 
work-group dummies  and  that of the full main-effects model.  The  individual 
contribution (0:) is  measured  by  the variation unexplained by 
work-group. 2.  The  Data 
The  data used  are Bureau  of Labor  Statistics Industry Occupational  Wage 
Surveys  for six manufacturing industries.  Table  3  presents means  of the basic 
characteristics of the  samples.  (Means  of all variables used  in  the analysis 
appear  in  the appendix.) 
Separate  analysis of industries allows occupations to  be  narrowly defined, 
while covering a large proportion of each  employer's work  force.  In 
cross-industry surveys,  either occupations must  be  very broadly defined  or the 
vast majority of the employees  of each  establishment  are excluded  from 
analysis,  because  only support occupations  are employed  in  common  across 
employers.  Since  industries as  a whole  have  wage  differentials,  analysis 
within industry tends  to  underestimate  the contribution of establishment  by 
the size of the industry effect. 
The  data consist of the wages,  sex,  occupation,  and  establishment 
identifier of individual production and  maintenance  workers.  Wages  reported 
are  straight-time hourly wages  (no overtime or shift premia  included)  for 
hourly workers,  and  average  hourly earnings  for incentive workers.  A1 though 
confidential i  ty  restrictions prohibit the release of employers'  names,  the 
data include unique establishment  identifiers and  plant characteristics: 
for  example,  size,  industry sector,  major method of  pay,  union  affiliation, 
major product,  and  region. 
An  important  feature of these  data are the occupation definitions.  These 
industry-specific  job classifications are more  detailed than 4-digit 
Dictionary of Occupational  Titles or Census  codes  and  cover  approximately  60 
I 
percent of  establishment employment.  For  example,  in the plastics sample, 
codes  distinguished among  these  three occupations working on  a blow-molding 
I 
machine:  'operate' ,  ' set-up' , and  ' set-up  and  operate. '  This  level of  detai  1 provides  strong control for  human  capital as  productively used. 
Each  extensive  survey  covers  from 11,000  to  168,000  workers  and  from 57  to 
876  establishments.  The  six manufacturing  industries studied are an  arbitrary 
subset of the  industries with moderate  unionization rates in Freeman  (1981). 
The  industries  included are fairly diverse,  varying widely  in  proportion 
unionized,  male,  and  incentive. 
3.  The  Impact  of Establishment  Effects on  Wage  Dispersion 
Table  4  partitions the  total sum  of squares  of wage  for each  industry into 
five categories:  occupation,  establishment,  joint (occupation  and 
establ i  shment) , work-group,  and  individual  .  In  order  to  control for human 
capital as  fully as  possible,  sex,  region (where  available),  and  an  incentive 
dummy  are included with job classification in  the analysis below.'  For  ease 
of exposition,  the entire group of variables  is  referred to  as  "occupation" in 
the tables and  discussion  that follows,  except when  stated to  the contrary. 
In the six industries studied,  establishment effects within industry 
account  for a minimum of 12  percent to  58  percent (with a mean  of 31  percent) 
of wage  variation.  These  are differentials paid to  all production workers  in 
the establishment,  controlling for occupation,  sex,  incentive,  and  region. 
Despite  the  large number  of  establishments  surveyed  relative to  occupations, 
the establishment effects are  statistically significant when  added  as  a group 
to  models  with occupation already  included.  Further  characteristics of the 
estimated establishment  coefficients are explored below,  after a discussion of 
the other components  of wage  variation. 
As  expected,  occupation  is  also a powerful  determinant of wage,  accounting 
for 11  percent  to  35  percent (with a mean  of 20  percent)  of wage  variation. 
But,  in  only one  case  out of six (cotton textiles),  is  occupation a more powerful  determinant (alone  or with the joint contribution) of wages  than  is 
establishment.  In  the others,  establishment clearly dominates. 
The  contribution of work-group  (ranging from 8  percent to  14 percent of 
variation)  indicates that,  on  average,  differing internal  labor-market 
structures cause  only 10  percent of wage  variance,  although they are 
significant in  each of the  industries studied.  The  small  size of the 
work-group  term relative to the establishment term (about one  third on 
average),  is evidence  that the ranking of employers  is  fairly consistent 
across occupations.  A  high-wage  employer  for one  occupation is  also a 
high-wage  employer  for the other occupations  employed  there.  That  is,  despite 
the different ways  in  which  various occupations enter the production process, 
they  tend to have  similar establishment differentials. 
Finally,  individual  (within work-group)  variation contributes  the  smallest 
portion of variance  (3 percent to  7  percent)  in  the  industries with few 
incentive workers  (plastics,  structural steel,  and  chemicals)  and  a larger 
portion (27  percent to  51  percent)  in  the  industries with many  incentive 
workers  (wool  and  cotton textiles, and  shirts and  nightwear).  Another  way  to 
view  the small  proportion contributed by  individual  variation in  nonincentive 
workers'  wages  is to  note  that the coefficient of determination  (RZ) of 
occupation,  establishment,  and  work-group  in  a wage  equation for these 
industries averages  96  percent:  far higher  than  that usually achieved  in 
cross-sectional  wags  equations. 
Because  the F-statistics for the inclusion of each  source of dispersion 
are all strongly significant,  only model  8  in table 1  cannot  be  rejected. 
However,  the relative size of the components  suggests  that the best shorthand 
version of the wage-setting mechanism  (in the absence  of incentive pay)  is 
actually model  5:  wage  variation is  primarily due  to  only two 
factors--occupational differentials and  establishment  differentials. 4.  Characteristics of Estimated  Establishment Differentials 
Table  5 summarizes  information about  the estimated  establishment 
differentials.  The  first  column  repeats  the information from row  3  of 
table 4:  the percent  sum  of squares  (contribution to  R2) from the addition 
of establishment  to  a regression with occupation.  This percentage does  not 
include differences  in  total earnings  variation between  industries.  Row  2 
presents  the results of  multiplication of the percentage  of the  sum  of  squares 
due  to  establishment by  the  total variance of the  industry sample,  and  then 
taking the square  root to  generate  a  'suggested  standard deviation.'  As  an 
upper  bound  on  the contribution of establishment,  the  third column  reports the 
R
2  from a regression of wages  on  establishment alone  (that is,  the 
establishment,  plus  'joint' portions of variation).  The  fourth column 
multiplies the previous  column  by  industry wage  variation and  takes  the  square 
root. 
These  four columns  make  the following point:  establishment differentials 
account  for 12  percent  to  58  percent of wage  variation,  controlling for 
occupation--and 17  percent to  85  percent,  not controlling for occupation.  On 
average,  they generate 32  percent or 50  percent of variation,  (controlling 
for,  or  not controlling for,  occupation).  And,  in terms  of standard 
deviations,  establishment  contributes a standard  deviation of 11  percent to  14 
percent of  mean  wages. 
Alternatively,  we  can  evaluate  the  size of these  differentials by 
examining  characteristics of the actual  estimated differentials.  The  last 
three  columns  of table 5  present  the minimum  and  maximum  estimated 
differential  and  the variance of the differentials for each  industry,  from the 
model  control  1  ing for occupation.  The  magnitude of the extrema  is striking. Workers  in  the lowest-wage  establishments  receive as  little  as  58  percent 
below  the mean  for their occupations,  while the highest-wage employers  pay  as 
much  as  110  percent above  occupational  averages.  The  mean  spread  is from  35 
percent below  the mean  to  66  percent above it; both are three to  four  times 
the union wage  differential of  12  percent  to  15  percent.  On  average,  the most 
generous  employers  pay employees  in  each  occupation  twice as  much  as  do  the 
lowest-wage  employers  in  the  industry. 
The  final column  in  table 5 shows  the  standard deviation of the estimated 
establishment differentials in  each  industry.  These  fall between  the 
estimates in  columns  2  and  4 in  half of the cases,  and  above  the column  4 
estimates in  the other three cases.  The  mean  (0.14)  is the same  as  that of 
column  4,  and  is  well  above  the figures used  in  the remainder  of  this 
analysis:  namely,  those in  column  2. 
For i  1  lustrative purposes,  figure 1 provides plots of  estimated 
establishment  differentials within these  six industries,  weighted  by  the 
number  of workers  surveyed  in  each  establishment.  These  patterns reveal 
differences  among  wage  patterns  in  the six industries.  In  the absence  of 
further  investigation,  the purpose of these plots must  be  to  stimulate 
discussion and  research,  and  to  demonstrate  that although  some  outliers exist, 
they do not constitute the bulk of  variation. 
The  plots offer some  intriguing variations.  In  cotton textiles,  the 
industry with the least between-establishment variation,  differentials are 
highly concentrated close to  the 0 percent differential  line.  Fabricated 
structural steel,  shirts &  nightwear,  and  plastics appear  to  have  fairly even, 
symmetrical  distributions.  Wool  textiles shows  the strongest evidence of 
bimodality.  (Perhaps  a dual  labor market?)  Chemicals  is  the only industry to 
show  a marked  skewness  to  the left. 5.  Summary  of  Results 
Table  4  partitions the sums  of squares  for each  industry,  but does  not 
indicate estimated variances for the components  of interest.  Table  6 presents 
the "suggested  standard deviation" for all components  of within-industry wage 
variation for all six industries.  In  order  to  stack the deck  against the 
investigated effect,  the  joint effects from table 4  are allocated to 
occupation.  The  last column  presents  the  simple mean  for each  factor.  By 
this admittedly crude  calculation,  employer  differentials alone  in  an 
industry-wage  distribution generate  an  average  standard deviation of 11 
percent. 
How  large are these  numbers  in  practical terms?  The  experiment  that this 
research  tries to simulate  is  the random  transfer of a worker  in  one 
establishment to  a job in the same  occupation at another  establishment.  What 
is the expected  wage  change  from such  a switch? 
This  question asks  for the expected  absolute  value of the difference 
between  two  identically distributed random  variables.  Assuming  a normal 
distribution of differentials,  the question reduces  as  follows: 
where  d =  random  differential-N(O,o;>,  and  OCOl  and  QC01  are the normal 
density and  the cumulative normal  density functions,  evaluated at zero. 
Using the results from the last column  of table 6,  a random  switch in 
establishment  within industry (within job classification,  sex,  region and 
incentive class) yields an  expected  change  in  wages  of 12  percent.  This corresponds  to a difference of $2,450  per year for the average  blue-collar 
production worker  in  manufacturing  in  1986  (out of $20,400).  In  contrast,  a 
random  switch in  occupation (holding establishment  fixed) results in  an 
expected difference of 14  percent or $2,860  in  yearly income.  Switching 
employers  within industry results in  a very large expected  income  change, 
almost as  large as  that from a switch in  occupation within industry.  It  will 
be  argued  later that the size of these differentials makes  it  unlikely that 
they are caused  by  random  variations. 
Changes  in the internal  wage  structure (that is,  changing  the way  a 
particular occupation is  rewarded  in  an  establishment)  generate  a wage  change 
of  7  percent,  or $1,430.  Finally,  switching places  with another  individual in 
the same  work-group yields an  expected  difference  of from 3  percent  to  16 
percent,  depending  on  the pay  scheme. 
6.  Are  These  Results Unrepresentative? 
Because  union and  nonunion  wage-setting mechanisms  differ and  because 
these  industries are more  highly unionized than the average,  table 7  compares 
the suggested  standard deviations for union and  nonunion establishments  in  the 
plastics industry.  The  results for the two sectors are fairly similar,  except 
that (consistent  with Freeman  C19811),  total variance  for the union  sample  is 
lower.  The  decrease  in  total variance in  the union sector  shows  up 
consistently in  all components  of  variance except  for the establishment 
contribution.  The  standard deviation due  to  establishment  appears  the  same  or 
higher in  the union sector.  Establishment effects are not primarily a union, 
nor a nonunion,  nor a between-sector phenomenon. 
In  order  to check  whether  these results are due  to  unrepresentative  data, 
the following other tests were  conducted:  (1)  establishment characteristics (size,  number,  industry sector)  were  compared  to those of establishments  in 
the Census  of  Manufactures -- no  systematic differences were  apparent;  (2) 
individual worker  characteristics (sex,  union coverage,  occupational 
distribution)  were  compared  to those  in the CPS--again,  no major  differences 
were  noted);  and,  (3) results were  recalculated using weights  supplied by  the 
Bureau of Labor  Statistics (BLSI--the  percentage  of variation attributed to 
establishment  rose.  None  of these  tests casts doubt on  the results reported 
above. 
IV.  Understanding Establishment  Effects 
A  first step  in  the search for explanations for the variation in wages 
among  employers  is  consultation with personnel  officers and  personnel  texts 
(for examples,  see  Groshen  C19861,  Lester  El9481  and  Foul  kes  C19801). 
These  sources  provide suggestions,  but do not pinpoint the  source(s)  of 
employer  wage  variation.  Most  consistent  is the emphasis  on  widespread  use  of 
wage  surveys  by  employers  in  order  to  maintain awareness  of  market  wages. 
1.  Sorting by Ability (Education,  Age,  and  Tenure) 
Variations in  human  capital can  generate apparent establishment 
differentials, if  establishments are sorted by  human  capital  within 
occupation.  To  investigate  the likelihood of this,  the explanatory power  of 
education and  experience  in  the plastics industry in the CPS  is  compared  to 
that of  establishment  in  the plastics INS.  Then,  the INS  data is  examined  for 
evidence  of differing tenure (or experience)  distributions among 
establishments. 
First,  the  small  contribution of  variation among  individuals within work-group  to total wage  variation suggests  that differences  in  ability within 
occupation within particular establ i  shments  are either quite small,  or are not 
reflected  in  wages.  If such  differences  are  small,  then either occupation 
dummies  should capture most  important differences in  ability,  or 
establishments  are  strongly and  consistently  sorted by  ability.  If productive 
differences  in  human  capital  are not reflected in  wages,  then they presumably 
affect  probabi  1 i  ty  of promotion,  which argues  again  that IWS  job 
classification controls well  for ability. 
Thus,  the crucial question is whether  standard measures  of ability, if 
they were  available,  would  reduce  the importance  of establishment 
differentials in  explaining wage  variation.  In  other words,  are the IWS  job 
classifications  sufficiently detailed to  capture most  economically relevant 
variations in  human  capital?''  We  can  test this using theCPS,  which 
provides  both occupation and  human  capital variables for its  respondents. 
The  occupations  in the CPS  are less detailed:  the 42  job classifications 
in  the plastics IWS  correspond  to  about  12  CPS  3-digit occupations. 
Nevertheless,  the explanatory power  of education,  experience (that is, 
age-education-61,  experience-squared and  their interactions with sex  are  small 
relative to the explanatory power  of establishment  in  the INS.  Table 8 
reports regression results for a CPS  sample  of 383  plastics industry 
employees.  After occupation,  sex,  and  region,  the traditional,  measurable 
human  capital variables contribute just 7.5  percent  to  the  R.'  for a1 1 
plastics workers  and  5.5  percent for the 199  workers  in  INS occupations,  or 
less  than one  quarter of the minimum  of 29.1  percent of wage  variation 
explained by  establishment in the  INS data.  Thus,  omission of years of 
education and  of  experience and  any  qua1 i  ties correlated with them,  could not 
be  the only source of establishment differentials. In  particular, years of  education can  be  rejected as  a source  of 
establishment  differentials among  plastics workers.  The  fact that education 
adds  virtually no  explanatory power  within the relatively coarse CPS 
occupation categories essentially rules out the possibility that this standard 
measure  of education (or other unmeasured  quality differences correlated with 
it)  has  an  effect on  wages  within narrow  IWS  job classifications. 
Almost  all  of the  impact  of human  capital on  wages  within CPS  occupations 
is due  to  years of potential  experience.  To  the extent  that experience  (and 
other unmeasured  quality differences  correlated with it)  is  associated with 
promotion to  different job classifications (within  the broad CPS  occupations), 
the fineness of INS occupational  categories  will capture  this wage  variation 
and  not attribute it  to  establ  ishment.  If, on  the other hand,  increased 
experience primarily raises wages  within job classification,  and 
establishments  vary  significantly by  the average  experience of their work 
force,  then  some  of the establishment-effects reported above  could be  due  to 
experience  differentials.  However,  the results in  table 8  suggest  that the 
maximum  possible effect is small  relative to  the total. 
A  second  guage  for the potential  effect of sorting by  experience,.or  by 
length-of-service (tenure)  as  well,  is  to  examine  the robustness  of the ANOVA 
with respect  to  distribution of wages  within work-group.  Although differences 
in  mean  tenure or experience  (for example,  because  of establishment age)  could 
produce  apparent  establishment  differentials between  two establishments  with 
identical  wage  policies,  experience  and  tenure  will vary  somewhat  among 
workers  within work-groups.  The  minimum  and  maximum  wage  levels in  each 
work-group  should be  more  robust  than the mean  to the effects  of tenure 
variation.  The  lower  sensitivity of the minima  to  differences in  mean  tenure 
arises from purely random  turnover  (for example,  due  to  deaths).  The  lower sensitivity of maxima  arises from productivity ceilings within jobs.  That  is, 
wage  growth in  blue-collar jobs  is  approximately flat after a small  amount  of 
tenure  (Abraham  and  Farber  C19871). 
It  follows that if differing average  tenure or experience  is  an  important 
source  of  apparent  establishment differentials,  work-group minima  and  maxima 
should demonstrate  less variation by  establishment  than do work-group means. 
If,  on  the other hand,  establ i  shment  differential  s  are  consistent across  a1 1 
levels of tenure and  average  tenure does  not vary greatly among 
establishments,  then ANOVA  of extrema  will be  similar to  ANOVA  of  means." 
The  ANOVA  in  table 4 (based  on  work-group means)  can  be  performed on 
work-group minima  and  maxima.  Compared  to  the results in  table 4, 
establishment effects are not diminished in  any  of  four industries.  In fact, 
employer  effects are  stronger  in  all cases.  Furthermore,  the correlation 
between  the minima  and maxima  in  work-groups  is  0.50  in  plastics.  This 
suggests  that establishments  with low  starting wages  have  low average wages 
and  low ceiling wages. 
Thus,  employer  differentials are apparently not due  to  variations in 
average education,  tenure,  experience or unobservable  characteristics 
correlated with these measures  of  human  capital.  Other  studies  that attempt 
to  relate wages  to  qua1 i  ty  uncorrelated with traditional human  capital 
measures  find only weak  relationships,  at best (for tests of  ability, see 
Evans  C19601 and  Conant  C19631;  for IQ  and  latent measures,  see  Griliches 
El  977  and  19791).  These  studies  throw some  doubt on  the  1  i  kel i  hood of sorting 
by  unmeasured  quality differences. 
2.  Compensating Differentials 
In  order  for compensating  differentials to  generate establishment differentials,  they must compensate for establishment-wide conditions of 
employment, and these conditions must vary substantially within the industry. 
Most studies of compensating differentials attempt to identify differentials 
between industries, where working conditions presumably vary even more than 
they do  within industry.  Nevertheless, such inquiries have been marked by 
their lack of success  (Smith  C19791),  except for risk of injury or  death, 
neither of which is a factor across the occupations or industries examined 
here.  For working conditions, see Brown (19801, for layoff risk, see Tope1 
(1984).  The IWS data do  not include explicit information on working 
conditions.  However, if  working conditions vary more among industries than 
within industry  (as  most studies assume),  the lack of success in 
between-industry studies makes it unlikely that between-establishment 
differentials are primarily compensating differentials for working conditions. 
It is also unlikely that they compensate for differences in fringe 
benefits.  Freeman  (19811, Smith and Ehrenberg  (19811, and Atrostic  (1983) 
find  that inclusion of fringe benefits exaggerates wage differences, that is, 
scale effects among employers dominate any detectable substitution effects. 
This conclusion is supported by Ebert~  and Stone (1985>,  who  find evidence of 
compensating differentials  (for  conditions and fringes) within occupation and 
industry only after controlling for scale effects associated with employer 
characteristics.  ' *  Thus, compensating differentials for fringes and working 
conditions are apparently second-order, not first-order, effects. 
The possibility of less easily identiXiable  (to  researchers, that is) 
variations in plantwide quality of employment remains.  Some of these,  (for 
example, effort level, geographic convenience, personnel treatment, or 
environmental quality--noise, ventilation, fumes) await further data. However,  two rather mechanical  possibilities remain and  are explored 
below:  variations in  age-earnings profiles (that is,  implicit contracts)  and 
staggered  annual  raise dates. 
Suppose  establishments  differ in  age-earnings profiles, but not in the 
total of lifetime compensation offered to  workers.  Some  employers  offer steep 
profiles,  with low entry-level wages  but high wages  later on.  Others offer a 
flatter progression.  We  would  see  apparent  establishment differentials if 
workers'  1  ifetime employment  progressions were  primarily within job 
classification and  employers  differed both in  average  tenure and  in  steepness 
of  profile.'  Jobs  with low  starting wages  would  have  correspondingly  high 
maximum  rates.  This  implies a negative  correlation between  minimum  and 
maximum  wages  (controlling for occupation mean).  However,  the actual 
correlation for plastics is 0.50,  so  we  can  also reject this form of implicit 
contract explanation.14 
A  final  compensating  differential possibility is staggered dates of  annual 
salary adjustments:  that is, employers  pay  the same  annual  wages,  but differ 
in the date of annual  adjustment  for inflation.  Variance  attributable to this 
source  is  maximized if plants are  surveyed on  the day  before half of the 
sample  receive  their annual  raise but  just after the other half receive 
theirs.  In  that case,  the maximum  variation due  to inflation is (1/4)r2, 
where r =  In  (1 + i),  and i =  rate of inflation.  For  instance,  in  the case  of 
plastics in  1974,  the rate of inflation was  8.7  percent,  so  the maximum 
possible contribution to variance is .0017,  which  is  2.8  percent of the total 
variation and  less than a tenth of the estimated establishment effect. l5 
Thus,  the observed patterns of  wage  variation are  inconsistent with 
earl  ier research on  compensating  differential  s,  with age-earnings profi  les and 
with staggered  inflation as  possible sources. 3.  Random  Variations 
Wage  differentials that depend  systematically on  the characteristics of 
the establishments are not random.  Table  9 provides  evidence  that the 
employer  differentials  estimated above  can  be  associated with measurable 
employer  characteristics.  Establishment  characteristics provided in INS  data 
account for about half of the variation due  to  establishment differentials, 
even  though  the number  of characteristics variables is  about  10  percent of the 
number  of establishments  in  each  industry.  l6  As  the table indicates,  the 
characteristics included are proportion male,  establishment  size,  and major 
product,  technology,  and  pay method.  These  characteristics generally 
correspond  to  the factors explored by economists  in  the 1940s  and  1950s  and 
clearly continue to inflwnce wages. 
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The  results reported here are encouraging for the study of  employer 
activity in  wage  setting because  they indicate that wage-relevant differences 
among  employers are observable.  Nevertheless,  while these factors are 
important determinants of  wages,  they do not supply  the whole  story. 
Coefficient estimates  for characteristics of establishments  in  the six 
industries are reported in  Groshen  (1986).  Because  of  the large sample  sizes, 
most  of the coefficients are  statistically significant.  Many  variables are of 
economic  significance as  well  (in particular,  establishment  size,  union 
affiliation,  and major pay policy).  The  following parts describe the 
relevance of  some  of the coefficients and  other results to  wage-determination 
model s  . 
Both the extent to  which  the differentials depend  on  the factors included 
and  the persistence of importance  of these  factors (since at least the  1940s) 
make  the random  variations hypothesis unlikely.  For  instance,  it  is implausible that personnel  officers of  large firms are a1 1  consistently wrong, 
all mistakenly setting their wages  too high,  for 40  years.  If  observed 
differentials  are generated by random  errors,  information must  be  costly.  The 
IWS  are conducted  at no marginal  cost to the participants and  have  been 
available to  the public at  no cost for about  40  years.  Additional 
independent,  private wage  surveys  (formal  and  informal)  are prevalent  in  all 
sectors of the economy:  often provided to  employers for  the cost of 
contributing information on  their own  wage  structure. 
Futhermore,  Groshen  (1986  and  1988b)  finds that establishment 
differentials  within an  area are virtually stationary over  six years,  and of 
almost exactly the same  magnitude  as  those estimated here. 
One  can  also compare  wage  variation to  that observed  in  consumer  product 
prices.  For  the  seven  products whose  average  price was  over $90,  Pratt,  Wise 
and  Zeckhauser  (1979)  found the average  coefficient of variation of  prices was 
9 percent.  This  is  somewhat  smaller  than the 11  percent  standard deviation 
among  establishments.  However,  this comparison  may  not be  strongly relevant, 
because  none  of these  seven  expensive  items  comprised a large portion of 
consumer  expenditures,  while wages  are a major  part of both employee  income 
and  employer  costs. 
In  short,  the magnitude  of  establishment differentials,  their persistence 
over  time,  their correlation with establishment  characteristics,  and  the low 
cost of wage-survey  data provide compelling evidence  against the hypothesis 
that establishment  differentials are random  noise. 
4.  Non-Market-Clearing Models:  Efficiency Wages  and  Bargaining 
Thus,  establishment  wage  differences cannot  be  readily explained by  simple 
market models  of wage  determination.  This  suggests  that attention should be directed to  other models, in particular, to bargaining and efficiency-wage 
models.  However, direct evidence to  support or contradict these models is 
1 imited. 
Efficiency Wages.  Efficiency wage arguments posit causality between 
workers' wages and on-the-job productivity (Yellen C19841, Stiglitz 11984, 
19871).  Thus, some employers may maximize profits by  paying a differential 
above the market-cleari  ng wage, if resulting increments in  productivity exceed 
costs of  the differential.  At least five sources of increased productivity 
have been modeled:  reduced monitoring  (or  shirking) costs (Bulow and Summers 
C19851 and Shapiro and Stigl  i tz C198411, decreased turnover (Salop C19791), 
sociological considerations  (Akerlof 119821),  market insulation and corporate 
consistency  (Doeringer  and Piore 119711).  These models can be invoked to 
explain differentials among firms in two ways.  First, the profit-maximizing 
point is locally  (almost)  flat, so, firms' indifference among possible 
combinations  (plus  costs of adjustment) result in  a random distribution of 
strategies (Bulow and Summers  C19851).  Second, differences  in technology  (for 
example, vintage effects),  or products (for  example, differentiated quality 
ni ches) may reveal otherwi  se unobservable variations in the productivity of 
workers to  a few sectors of the market.  Efficiency differentials become 
establishment differentials when workers in all  or most occupations in the 
establishment are affected similarly. 
One finding of the ANOVA is relevant for some efficiency-wage 
explanations  :  the small  contribution of work-group.  Its persi  stently modest 
size (3 percent to  7 percent of variation) suggests that blue-collar 
occupations are largely treated similarly by establishments.  This suggests 
that the peculiarities of  a job that make it efficient for  an employer to 
offer  a wage premium are largely the same for these positions.  This mediates against monitoring versions based on  very narrow occupation-specific 
responsibilities.  However,  it  is  not inconsistent with all versions. 
A  second  test for efficiency-wage explanations  lies in  the contrast 
between  the ANOVA  patterns of industries with high and  low proportions of 
incentive workers.  If establishment  differentials are efficiency-wage premia, 
then  they are unnecessary  for workers  whose  wages  are linked to  individual 
performance,  producing a negative correlation between  prevalence of 
establishment differentials and  incentive workers.  Among  the industries 
studied,  the correlation between  percentage  incentive and  suggested  standard 
deviations  is  -0.60.18  Although  this is  not significant for a sample  of six 
industries, it  is  of the correct sign and  not small.  Thus,  it  lends  some 
support  to  the hypothesis. 
Bargaining or InsiderlOutsider Models.  Variation in  firms'  rents and  in 
employees'  bargaining power  (or  agency  costs)  are the two necessary conditions 
for bargaining models  to  produce  wage  dispersion.  These  models  differ in  the 
identity of agents  and  enforcement mechanisms.  The  bargaining agents  are 
clearest in  the case  of unionism;  otherwise,  the workers'  bargaining agent  is 
not obvious,  although economists  have  long noted the existence of informal 
organization by  nonunion  workers  (Dunlop  C19571):  including union-threat 
effect  versions,  (Dickens  C198611,  and  managerial  capitalismlagency cost 
versions  (Aoki  [19841,  or Edwards  C19801).  For  bargaining models  to  predict 
establishment differentials,  they must  include an  assumption  that binds 
together workers  of different occupations:  bargaining power  is constant 
across occupations  in  establishments,  or,  workers must  form large groups  in 
order  to exert bargaining power,  or,  manageri  a1  a1  trui  sm  extends uni  formly 
across occupations. In  bargaining models,  a major  obstacle is  the problem of identification of 
the bargaining agent  for nonunion  workers.  The  strongest  direct evidence 
relevant to the bargaining hypothesis  in  this study comes  from the 
coefficients  and  the explanatory power  of major union affiliation.  To  the 
extent  that unions vary by  militancy and  by  the  size of  rents in  the industry 
sector where  they bargain,  the rents captured for their members  can  be 
expected  to  vary.  Coefficient estimates  for the major union affiliation in 
the six samples  suggest  differentials of  up  to  20  percent (in chemicals) 
between  the highest-  and  lowest-wage  unions. '  Apparently,  there are  1  arge 
differences  among  unions'  abilities to  raise wages  for their members. 
The  nonunion  sector  is  not monolithic either;  table 7 demonstrates  that 
wages  vary by  establishment in  the nonunion  sector.  These  differences are 
linked to industry sector and  principal and  secondary  product of the 
establishment,  which  is  also consistent with bargaining models.  The  more 
variation in  product market  conditions,  the more  variation in  available 
rents.  However,  bargaining is  not the only explanation for the importance of 
these  variables.  (For  example,  different products may  demand  different worker 
attention to  detail,  perhaps  affecting the efficient wage  for the 
manufacturer.) 
Kleiner and  Boullion  (1987)  support  the bargaining hypothesis.  In  a 
sample  of  union and  nonunion  establishments,  they find that average  wages  are 
strongly and  positively correlated with the extent of provision of  firm 
financi  a1  information. V.  Conclusion 
1.  Summary  of Findings 
The  U.S.  manufacturing  sector  consists of 350,000  establishments, 
employing  20  million people.  Yet,  the activities of these  enterprises  as 
employers  are  rarely the focus  of labor economics  research or theory.  Current 
labor-market research focuses  primarily on  the wage  impact of  sex,  race, 
education,  and  age--even  though  those  factors all together probably account 
for  less wage  variation than does  identity of employer.  The  conclusions of 
the work  reported above  are as  follows: 
(1)  20  percent  to 70 percent of  wage  variance among  blue-collar workers 
within industry is due  to employer-based  differences  (estimated  standard 
deviation due  to employer  differentials within industry is 11  percent).  This 
standard deviation of 11  percent of the mean  is comparable  to  the size of 
industry effects,  which  in  the Current Population Survey  (controlling for 
occupation and  demographic  variables) have  a standard deviation of 
approximately  15  percent.  Combined,  these  two  sources  generate a standard 
deviation of approximately  19  percent:  which  is a major  portion of the total 
standard deviation of wages  of about  50  percent. 
(2)  Internal  labor market  variations (as  measured  by  the work-group, 
occupation-establishment  interaction,  term in  ANOVA)  generate  less than  10 
percent of wage  variance. 
(3) Characteristics  of establishments (size,  union affiliation, principal 
product,  technology,  and  principal pay  method)  can  account  for at least 
one-half  of measured  establishment  effects. 
These  observed  establishment  differentials are almost certainly not random 
variations.  Nor  are  they consistent with explanations based  on observable human  capital or compensating differentials.  These  findings  suggest  the need 
for  further  investigation of efficiency wages,  bargaining or sorting by 
unmeasured  worker  quality differences  (uncorrelated  with standard measures  of 
human  capital).  However,  in  these  data direct evidence  for these  later 
hypotheses  is 1  imi  ted. 
2.  Discussion 
This  study demonstrates  the importance of employer  identity in  wage 
determination among  blue-collar workers  in  manufacturing.  Groshen  (1986, 
1988b)  extends  this analysis  to  a  cross-industry (42  two-digit SICS) sample 
that includes whi te-col  lar occupations,  with remarkably  consi stent results. 
So  although employers  differ somewhat  in the way  they treat different 
occupations,  the average  variations between  employers  overshadows  occupation- 
specific employer  (that is,  work-group)  wage  effects.  Relative to 
occupational  means,  employers  tend to  compensate  janitors as  well  (or as 
poorly)  as  they do millwrights or assemblers. 
When  job classification and  employer  are well-identified,  they  can  explain 
over  90  percent of wage  variation.  Unless  one  has  an  explicit incentive 
component  to  one's  compensation,  working harder  at one's  job wi  11  not 
significantly increase  wages.  Only  a promotion or a change  of employer  can 
raise wages  significantly.  These  effects are roughly comparable  in  size 
within industry. 
A  striking implication oft the minimal  wage  variation within work-group  is 
that all  other characteristics of individuals (for example,  race,  education, 
marital  status)  must  operate  through occupation,  employer,  or work-group  in 
order for  them  to  have  a  significant impact on  wages.  This  implies that the 
research agenda  for labor economics  should include study of the major activities of employers :  recruitment,  promotion,  forced separation,  and 
general  wage-leve-1  policies.  For  instance,  based  on  this research,  barriers 
to  entry (such  as  discrimination)  into highly remunerative occupations or 
establishments can  have  a devastating impact on  earnings.  In  particular,  many 
of  the most  heavily researched wage  patterns and  inequalities in  the labor 
market  are probably manifestations of employer  wage  differentials. Endnotes 
1.  Another  reason  for the continuing focus on  labor-supply variables  is the 
access  to  household  survey data,  which  typically record no  information 
about  employer  other than industry. 
2.  Richard Lester,  Lloyd Reynolds,  Martin Segal , John  Dunlop,  Gregg  Lewis  and 
others  studied interindustry,  intra-industry,  union,  employer  size,  and 
regional  differentials,  focusing on  variables controlled by  employers 
(that is,  labor demand)  and medium-run  labor  supply. 
3.  Although  the terms  wages  and  earnings  are used  interchangeably  in  the 
text,  industrial relations distinguishes between  two components  of  wage 
determi  nation:  the formation of compensation  pol  icy (the periodic 
adjustment of wage  and  benefit schedules  and  rules),  and  the 
administration of policy (decisions  about hiring,  piece rates,  overtime, 
discipline,  etc.)  Because  the data used  here  include both wages  and 
earnings  (depending  on  receipt of incentive payments),  the  total  (net) 
observed effects investigated here  could be  the product of differences  of 
pol  icy,  administration,  or both. 
4.  Virtually all ideas  in  the following discussion can  be  found  in the work 
of  earl  ier economists  (notably  Adam  Smith and  the labor economists of  the 
1940s  and  1950~1,  but were  formalized by,  and  are here referenced to, 
1 ater authors. 
5.  Technology  is  usually assumed  to  be  exogenous,  so  we  need  a.  random 
di  stri  bution of differences  in  costs of improving conditions.  If 
technology  is  not exogenous,  all firms will choose  the one  that maximizes 
profits,  so only those  combinations of  technologies and  compensating 
differentials  that yield the maximum  profits will coexist. 
6.  Lagged  adjustment,  the second  type of  random  variations model,  is  not 
inconsistent with the  information/search models,  but provides  a basis for 
the variations (wage  shocks)  and  an  additional reason for their 
persistence (internal  adjustment  costs).  These  models  focus  on  the 
employer,  and  are a1  so cal  led "geological  model s,"  for example  Dunlop 
(1982). 
Techniques  for estimation of variance  components  of a model  of  unbalanced 
design are detailed in  Searle (1971 1 and  Henderson  (1  953).  Restricted 
maximum  likelihood (RML)  techniques  are introduced in  Hocking,  Hackney  and 
Speed  (1978).  RML  techniques provide single estimates  of  variance 
components  and  their standard errors,  but at the expense  of imposing a 
rigid structure on  the distribution of the level  effects and  errors. 
Because  the appropriateness  of the structure imposed may  vary among 
industries,  and  because  the purpose of  the study is  to  investigate the 
nature of  establishment differentials, a nonparametric method  was 
preferred  for this analysis.  Groshen  (1986)  contains  a complete 
di  scussion and  examples  of the appl i  cation of a1  ternative techniques  to 
these  data. 8.  The  incentive dummy  equals  one  when  the  worker  in  question has  an 
incentive component  to  his or her earnings.  These  incentives may  be  in 
the form of individual or group piece rates,  and of  individual or group 
bonuses  or commissions. 
9.  See  Pigors and Meyers  (1973,  p.  363)  and  Sayles  and  Strauss  (1977,  p.355) 
for  lists  of the factors to  consider  in selecting desired establishment 
pay  levels.  Both  lists include employment  conditions:  this determines 
the equilibrium wage.  Both include quality of  workers,  implying the 
existence of some  intentional  sorting by  human  capital but not necessarily 
consistent across occupations.  Finally,  'ability to  pay'  appears  twice. 
The  most  direct interpretation of  ability to  pay  is  bargaining,  but it 
could be  linked to  efficiency wages  (if  employers reversed  the 
causality.)  The  rest of the second  list  mentions  some  compensating 
differentials and  some  factors of  ambiguous  relationship to  microeconomic 
theory (for example,  company  reputation,  pressure from other employers). 
Efficiency  wage  arguments  do not appear  explicitly in  either list, 
except perhaps  the turnover version.  In  fact,  Pigors and Meyers  warn  that 
differenti a1  s not tied directly to  performance  do not guarantee better 
performance:  "When  pay  is tied to  performance ... money  is  an  important 
motivator;  when it  is  not so  tied, it  does  not motivate...",  (p.  362). 
10.  Note  that the purpose of this exercise is  not to  demonstrate  that human 
capital  variables have  no  influence on  wages.  Rather,  the purpose  is to 
test whether  education,  experi  ence,  experi  ence-squared,  and  unmeasured 
ability correlated with them,  exert their influence on  wages  primarily 
through occupational  attainment,  as  opposed  to  raising wages  within 
occupation. 
11. If  tenure mostly leads  to  movement  between occupations  or promotion,  then 
occupation will capture differences in  tenure,  and  the employer  effect 
estimates will not be  biased. 
Eberts  and Stone  (1985)  analyze changes  in  New  York public school  teacher 
salaries,  controlling for changes  in  their personal  characteristics 
(education and  years experience)  and  school  district characteristics 
(budget,  enrol  lment and  teacher budget  share).  They  find the expected 
signs and  significant coefficients on paid leave days,  health benefits, 
drop-out rate,  teacher-student ratio  and  raci  a1  mix  of teachers.  However, 
the district characteristics are the strongest predictors in  the equation 
and,  when  dropped  from the regression,  coefficients on  the conditions of 
employment  switch signs or  become  insignificant. 
13.  If the progression is  among  classifications,  steep profile establishments 
would offer low wages  for entry-level positions,  but offer  high wages  for 
jobs attained after high tenure.  Flat profile employers  would offer 
average rates throughout employment.  But  this would  generate  high 
variance due  to  work-group,  not due  to  establ i  shment  alone.  So,  it  would 
not generate  the observed pattern of  variation. 
14.  Abraham and  Farber  (1987)  also reject implicit contract models  of  this 
sort in  their study of  Michigan PSID  respondents. 
15.  This generates  the highest possible expected  variation due  to  inflation. 16.  Because  the characteristics included are dummies  based  on  establ i  shment, 
they cannot  explain more  wage  variance than do  establishment dummies.  The 
dummies  span  the establ i  shment  space,  so  vectors of establ i  shment 
characteristics are linear combinations of establishment dummy  vectors. 
Therefore,  comparison of the R
2's of regressions  with characteristics to 
those  with dummies  yield estimates of the extent to  which  characteristics 
summarize  all the information relevant to  wage  determination in 
establ i  shments.  That  is, if the only important  difference among  these 
establishment were  union status,  then the R
2  of a regression of wages  on 
union status would  be  the same  as  that of  one  on  establishment dummies. 
The  dummies  would provide no  additional  information relevant to  wage 
formation. 
17.  The  correspondence  is not entirely coincidental,  because  the  INS program 
was  modified under  the influence of these economists,  in  order  to  aid in 
their administration of wage  and  price controls. 
18.  The  correlation between  percent incentive and  percent  sum  of  squares  due 
to establishment is -0.56.  The  correlation between  percent incentive and 
the percent  sum  of squares  due  to  occupations  is -0.25.  If the joint part 
of variation is  allocated to establishment,  the correlation is -0.52. 
19.  Independent  support for the existence of rent sharing in  the union sector 
comes  from John  Abowd's  (1985)  study of  the effect of union  settlements on 
value of the enterprise.  He  finds evidence of zero-sum  bargaining over 
rents.  Salinger  (1984)  gets consistent results using different data and 
basing results on  a unionlnonunion comparison. References 
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Variance  Components  Model  Interpretations 
2  2  2  2  MODEL  1.  0:  =  o,,  U,  =  on  =  UT  =  0 
INTERPRETATION:  Wages  are entirely random  or linked to individual  characteristics 
that are independent of occupation and  establishment.  (Consistent  with 
individual bargaining and/or  wages  equal  to  marginal  product,  which  is 
independent  of  occupation  and  establishment.) 
2  2  2  2  MODEL  2.  o:  =  o,  +  a,,  on =  or =  0 
INTERPRETATION:  Wages  are determined by occupation and  individual variation wi  thin 
occupation.  Patterns  are entirely independent  of employer.  (Consistent  with 
the dominance  of the external  labor market  in  wage  determination for  each 
occupation.  Employers  are price-takers.) 
2  2  2  2  MODEL  3.  o:  =  on  +  oc,  o,  =  or =  0 
INTERPRETATION:  Wages  are set by  establishments,  and  internal wage  structures are 
completely independent of  occupation.  (Consistent  with domination of 
idiosyncratic internal markets  in  wage  determination,  with no  worker  mobility 
between  employers.) 
2  2  2  2  MODEL  4.  U:  =  or  +  u,,  0,  =  on  =  0 
INTERPRETATION:  Wages  are consistent within work  group,  and,  on  average, 
do not differ across  occupations or employers.  (Consistent  with separate 
bargaining by  each  occupation  in  an  establ  ishment,  with outcome  independent  of 
productivity, or productivity independent  of  occupation and  establishment.) 
2  2  2  2  MODEL  5.  U;  =  U,  +  on  +  u,,  or =  0 
INTERPRETATION:  Wages  depend  on  occupation  and  employer.  Internal wage  structures 
mirror the economywide  occupational  structure,  except  for a uniform differen- 
tial paid to  all employees.  (Consistent  with an  external  market for each 
occupation and  collective bargaining by  employees,  or establishment  relative 
wage  policies,  evenly  distributed.  Internal labor markets  do  not vary.) 
2  2  2  2  MODEL  6.  =  U,  +  or +  u,,  U"  =  0 
INTERPRETATION:  Wages  are occupational  means,  plus differences due  to  varying 
establishment  internal  wage  structures.  On  average  (across  occupations), 
however,  establishments  do  not deviate from mean  wages.  (Similar  to  model  4, 
with an  influential external  market  for each  occupation.) 
2  2  2  2  MODEL  7.  o:  =  on  +  or +  o,,  o,  =  0 
INTERPRETATION:  Establ i  shments  differ in  mean  wages  paid to  workers,  and  a1 though 
their internal wage  structures do  depend  on  occupation,  these  internal 
structures have  nothing in common  from one  employer  to  the next.  (Consistent 
with the dominance  of internal  labor markets  and  lack of  worker  mobility or 
employee  collective bargaining with somewhat  unequal  distribution.) 
2  2  2  2  MODEL  8.  a:  =  o,  +  on  +  or +  o, 
INTERPRETATION:  The  most  general  model,  wages  depend  on  occupation differentials, 
establishment  differentials and  differences  in  internal  structures. 
(Consistent  with a complex  labor market:  wages  dependent  on  internal and 
external  labor markets  and  employer  relative wage  policies.) Table 2 
A Technique for Partitioning the Sum of Squares 
in Unbalanced Data 
Percent of Total 
Source of Variation  Sum of Squares* 
1.  Occupation, sex, region, incentive  RE -  Ri 
(controlling  for establishment) 
2.  Joint occupation &  establishment  Ri  +  Ri  -  R$ 
3.  Establishment  RE - Ri 
(controlling  for  occupation, etc.) 
4.  Work-group  R;  -  R: 
(controlling  for  occupation and 
establishment) 
5.  Total  between work-groups  R; 
6.  Individual  100% -  R; 
7.  TOTAL  1  00% 
*  The subscripts on the coefficients of determination correspond to the 
regression models listed below.  For ease of exposition, occupation, sex, 
region, and incentive are listed as occupation. 
where wIjk  =  In wage of individual k in occupation i  at establishment j 
XI  =  vector of occupation dummy variables for occupation  i 
Y, =  vector of establishment dummy variables for establishment j 
XIY,  =  interaction dummy variables for occupation  i  in 
establishment j,  that is, for work group ij,  and 
a,  8,  Y  =  vectors of estimated parameters. Table 3 
Summary  of Industry Wage  Survey Sample  Characteri  sti  cs 
Mi  scel 1  aneous  Industri  a1  Woo 1  Shirts &  Cotton  Structural 
Pl  asti  cs  Chemi cal  s  Texti  1  es  Ni  ghtwear  Texti  1  es  Steel 
Year 
Mean  wage  $3.31  $6.45  $3.18  $3.74  $3.11  $4.70 
Variance  In  (wage)  .063  .028  .032  ,042  .026  .031 
Percent male  48.1%  96.8%  58.4%  7.5%  53.1%  99.4% 
Percent  in  mostly 
union plants  52.5% 
Mode  establishment 
size category  100-249 
Percent  receive i  ncenti  ve 
pay of any  sort  6.2% 
Percent  in  mostly 
i  ndi  vi  dual  pi  ece- 
rate plants  2.9% 
Sample  size  70,355 
Number  of 
occupations 
Number  of 
establ i  shments  87 6 
Avg.  number  of persons 
of same  sex  per 
job classification  9.4 
Source:  Tabu1 ations from BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys Table  4 
Analysis of  Sources  of  Wage  Variance in  Six Industries' 
Mi  scel  laneous  Plastics  Industri  a1  Woo  1 
Products  Chemi cal  s  Texti  1 es  I 
Degrees  Percent of  Total  Degrees  Percent of Total  Degrees  Percent of  Total 
o  f  Sum  of Squares  o  f  Sum  of Squares  o  f  Sum  of Squares 
Source of Variation  Freedom  (F-Statistic)'  Freedom  (F-Statistic)'  Freedom  (F-Stati stic)' 
.  Occupation,  sex,  region,  and  4  6  29.1% 
incentive
2  (2,111) 
.  Joint occup.,  etc.  &  establishment  -  20.9 
.  Establ i  shment
3 
.  Work  group
4 
.  Total  between  work  groups  6,538  92.9 
.  Individual  62,847  7.1 
TOTAL  70,354  100.0% 
otal Sum  of  Squares  4,457 
This  table is  continued on  the next page.  See  table 2 for a guide to this method  of partitioning the sum  of 
squares  with an  unbalanced  design. 
Controlling for establishment. 
Control 1  ing for occupation,  sex,  region,  and  incentive. 
Including a1 1 interactions between  occupation,  sex,  incentive and  establishment,  control  1  ing for occupation and 
establishment. 
All F-Statistics are significant at well above  the 1 percent level. 
ource:  Tabulations  from BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table 4,  continued 
Analysis of Sources  of Wage  Variance in  Six Industries' 
Source of  Variation 
Men's  and  Boys'  Shirts  Cotton and  Man-Made  Fabricated Structural 
and  Ni  ghtwear  Texti  1  es  Steel  I 
Degrees  Percent of  Total  Degrees  Percent of Total  Degrees  Percent of Total 
of  Sum  of  Squares  o f  Sum  of Squares  of  Sum  of  Squares 
Freedom  (F-Stati sticI5  Freedom  (F-~tati  sticI5  Freedom  (F-Stati sti  c)' 
.  Occupation,  sex,  region,  and  33  11 .O%  4  7  34.9%  49  12.4% 
i  ncenti  ve
2  (217)  (2,583)  (476) 
.  Joint occup.,  etc.  &  establishment  -  7.3  -  4.6  -  43.9 
i.  ~stabl  i  shment 
:.  Work  group
4 
i.  Total between work  groups  3,172  49.4  7,526  60.5  3,984  96.2 
i.  Individual  36,895  50.6  160,487  39.5  19,246  3.8 
TOTAL  40,067  100.0%  168,013  100.0%  23,230  100  .O% 
'otal  Sum  of Squares  1,637  4,379  1,190 
'See table 2  for a  guide to this method of  partitioning the sum  of squares  with an  unbalanced  design. 
'Control  1 i  ng  for establ i  shment.  . 
'Control 1  i  ng  for occupation,  sex,  region and  incentive. 
'Incl  udi  ng  a1  1 interactions between occupation,  sex,  incentive and  establ i  shment,  control  1 i  ng  for occupation and 
establ i  shment . 
'All  F-statistics are significant at well above  the 1  percent level. 
Source:  Tabulations  from BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table 5 
Characteristics of Estimated Establishment Differentials  - 
Without Joint Contribution  With Joint Contribution  Range  of  Standard 
Estimated  Devi  ation 
Suggested  Suggested  Differential  s  of Estimated 
%SS  Std.  Deviation*  %SS  Std.  Deviation*  Low  High  Differentials 
Plastics  29.1  .14  40.0  .16  -38%  +110%  .15 
Industrial Chemicals  58.2  .13  73.1  .14  -58%  +27%  .15 
Wool  Texti  1  es  37.8  .ll  58.0  .14  -27%  +55%  .15 
Shirts &  Nightwear  20.6  .09  27.9  .10  -30%  +48%  .13 
Cotton Texti  1  es  12.4  .06  17.0  .06  -25%  +62%  .09 
Structural Steel  31.5  .13  85.4  .21  -34%  +93%  .18 
RANGE 
Minimum 
Maxi  mum 
MEAN  31.6  .ll  50.2  .14  -35%  +66%  .14 
*  Suggested  standard deviation =([category  proportion of CSSl  x  [industry  variance]) 'I2. 
Source:  Tabulations  from BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table 6 
Suggested  Standard Devi ations for Industry Wage  Surveys* 
Industrial  Woo 1 
Source  Plastics  Chemical s  Texti  1  es 
Occupation,  sex, 
Region  &  incentive  .18  .09  .09 
Establ i  shment  .14  .13  .ll 
Work-Group  .09  .05  .05 
Individual  .07  .03  .09 
TOTAL  .25  .17  .18 
Shirts 
and  Cot  ton  Structural  SIMPLE 
Ni  ghtwear  Texti  1  es  Steel  MEAN 
*Suggested  Standard  Deviation=(Ccategory proportion of CSSlxCindustry  variancel)"* 
Joint contribution is  allocated to  occupation. 
Source:  Table  4 Table 7 
Analysis of  Variance of  Plastics Industry Wage  Survey 
Union  vs.  Nonunion  Samples 
UNION  ESTABLISHMENTS  NONUNION  ESTABLISHMENTS  SUGGESTED 
STANDARD  DEVIATIONS* 
Source  of  Degrees  of  %  Total Sum  Degrees  of  %  Total Sum 
Variation  Freedom  of Squares  Freedom  of Squares  Union  Nonunion 
Occupation  and  sex  42  22.8%  4  2  33.5%  .16  .18 
Joint sex,  occupation,  -  20.7%  -  17.2%  -  - 
and  establ i  shment 
Establishment  397  39.9%  498  30.3%  .15  .14 
Individual  33,032  6.4%  29,940  8.6%  .06  .07 
TOTAL  36,748  100  .O%  33,605  100  .O%  .24  .25 
*Suggested  standard deviation=(  [category proportion of  CSSlxCi ndustry vari  ancel) 'I2. 
Joint contribution is  allocated to  occupation. 
Source:  Tabulations  from BLS  Miscellaneous Plastics Products Industry Wage  Survey. Table  8 
Additional Contribution of 
Human  Capital Variables When  Added  to  Current Population Survey 
Ln(Earnings1 Regressions  With Occupation,  Sex,  and  Region Dummies 
Plastics Workers  in  IWS 
All Plastics Employees  Surveyed Occupations 
Independent  d.f.  or  d.f.  or 
Variables  Coeff.  Total R
2  g2  Coeff.  Total  R
2  g2 
Occupation,  5  5  37.8 
male,  and  region 
Education  0.019  38.0  0.2  0.014  29.1  0.1 
(0.01 1)  (0.015) 
Experi  ence  0.013  42.8  4.8  0.01 0  32.4  3.3 
(i.e.,  age-ed.-6)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Exper. 2/100  -0.024  44.8  2.0  -0.01 7  34.2  1.8 
(0.010)  (0.016) 
Ma1 e*experi  ence  0.004  45.3  0.5  0.006  34.4  0.2 
(0.482)  (0.009) 
TOTAL  58  45.3  12  34.5 
Contribution of 
education,  experience,  7.5% 
experience  squared 
and  interactions 
with male 
Number  of  Observations  383 
Mean  ln(Earnings1  1.20 
Variance  .084 
Standard Deviation  .29 
Dummies  for years  were  included;  all reported figures are net of  annual  effects. 
Three-digit occupation classifications were  used. 
Source:  Merged  May  CPS  tapes,  1973,  1975,  1977. Table 9 
Comparison  of Regressions  on  Establ i  shment  Dummies  Wi  th 
Regressions  on  Establishment Characteristics in  Industry Wage  Surveys 
Industri  a1  Shirts and  Cotton 
Plastics  Chemi cal  s  Wool  Texti  1  es  Ni  ahtwear  Textiles 
Independent  Change  Change  Change  Change  Change 
&  Variables  -  R
2  fromEa.1  B2  fromEa.1  -  R
2  from Ea .1  B2  fromEa.1  -  R
2  from  Ea.1 
1.  Occupation,  sex,  50.0  -  29.2  -  27.1  -  18.3  -  39.5  - 
region &  incent- 
i  ve 
2.  Occup.,  etc.  and  79.1  +29.1  87.4  +58.2  65.9  +37.8  38.9  +20.6  51.9  +12.4 
establishment 
dummies 
3.  Occup.,  etc.  and  61.3  +11.3  53.8  +28.7  53.8  +26.6  29.0  +10.7  44.2  +4.7 
establishment 
characteristics' 
Ratio of explanatory 
power  of characteristics  .388  .492 





2  j5xuuaJ 
' See  table 4 for means  of  selected characteristics,  and  the appendix  for coefficient estimates  and means  of all characteristics. 
In  general,  the establishment  characteristics included as  follows:  in  SMSA,  percent male in  establishment,  principal  and  secondary  product, 
principal  and  secondary  pay  methods,  establishment  size range,  major union affiliations,  and  technology. 
Source:  Tabulations from  BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys.  I Figure 1 
Distribution of Establishment Wage Differentials 
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I  Estimated Wage Differential 
Source:  Tabu1  ati  ons  from  BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. The  Effect of Establishment Characteristics on  Log  Earnings 
Plastics Products 
Characteristic  Leve 1  s 
Occupation 
Reg i  on 
In  SMSA 
Proportion ma  1  e 
Ma1 e 
Receive  incentive pay 
Establishment 
size 
Major  union 
affi  1  iation 
Major pay 
pol i  cy 
Principal 
product 
None,  minority 
GI &  bottle wkrs 
Machine  &  aero 
Chemi cal  wkrs 
IGLWU 
UAW 
Rubber  wkrs 
Independent 
Other unions 
Indiv.  determin. 
Range-mer i  t 
Range-auto. 
Range-merit  &  auto. 
Single rate 
Indiv.  piece 
Indiv.  bonus 
Group  piece 
Group  bonus 
Mean  Coefficient or 
(in percent)  No.  of  Dummies 
Apparel  2.4  -0.052  (0.004) 
Bl  dg . materi  a1  s  5.9  0.003  (0.004) 
Contai  ners  18.0  -- 
Dishes  &  housewr.  13.3  -0.063  (0.002) 
Pipes  4.7  -0.033  (0.003) 
Other  55.7  -0.025  (0.002) Table  A-1,  continued 
The  Effect of  Establishment Characteristics on  Log  Earnings 
Plastics Products 
Characteristic  Leve 1 s 
Mean  Coefficient or 











Secondary pay  policy 
Secondary mol di  ng  activity 
Source:  Tabulations  from BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table A-2 
The Effect of  Establishment Characteristics on  Log  Earnings 
Industri  a1  Chemi cal  s 




Proport  ion  ma1  e 
Ma1  e 
Receive incentive pay 
Establishment 
size 
Level  s 
Mean 
(in  percent) 
Coefficient or 
No. of  Dummies 
Major  union  None or  minority  29.9  -- 
affi 1 iation  Intl  chem wkrs  11.5  -0.083  (0.002) 
Oil, chemical &  atomic  14.9  -0.074 (0.002) 
Steel workers  20.2  -0.025  (0.002) 
Independent  8.8  0.057  (0.002) 
Other unions  14.7  0.11  9 (0.007) 
Major  pay 










Range-merit  &  auto. 
Single  rate 
Indiv. piece rate 
Group bonus 
Commi s  s  i on 
Org.  1  prod. 
Org. only 
Org. &  inorg. 
Org. &  plastics 
Org. &  ot. chem. 
Inorg.  1  prod. 
Inorg. only 
Inorg. &  org. 
Inorg. &  plastics 
Inorg. &  gases 
Inorg. &  ot. chem. 
Inorg. &  non-chem. 
Source:  Tabulations from  BLS Industry Wage Surveys. Table A-3 
The  Effect of  Establishment Characteristics  on  Log  Earnings 
Wool  Textiles 
Characteristic  Levels 
Occupation 
In  SMSA 
Propor t i  on  ma1 e 
Ma1 e 
Receive  incentive pay 
Establ i  shment  20-49 




Mean  Coefficient or 
(in percent)  No.  of  Dummies 
Major  union  None  or minority  74.9  -- 
affiliation  Textile wkrs  union  17.7  -0.095  (0.006) 
U.  textile wkrs  1.8  0.066  (0.007) 
Other  unions  5.5  -0.033  (0.009) 
Major  pay 
pol i  cy 
Indiv.  determin.  3.8  -- 
Range-meri t  1.2  0.331  (0.010) 
Range-auto.  1.3  0.043  (0.013) 
Range  merit &  auto.  0.0  0.052  (0.007) 
Single rate  6.3  0.057  (0.006) 
Indiv.  piece  82.3  -0.144  (0.024) 
Group  piece  2.6  0.153  (0.0231 
Pri  nci  pal  Apparel  63.5  -- 
product  Bl  anketi  ng  1.4  0.075  (0.008) 
Woven  nonapparel  22.0  0.017  (0.003) 
Yarn  ex.  rug  8.4  0.218  (0.017) 
Rug  yarn  4.7  .261  (0.016) 
Scope  of  All wool 
operations  Mostly wool 
A1 1 blends 
Mostly blends 
Other 
Secondary  pay  policy 
R
2 
Spinning mill  13.1  -- 
Weavi ng  mi  1  1  4.2  0.133  (0.007) 
Integrated mill  82.7  -  - 
Source:  Tabulations  from BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table A-4 
The  Effect of Establishment Characteristics  on  Log  Earnings 
Mens'  and  Boys'  Shirts and  Nightwear 
Characteri  sti  c  Leve 1  s 
Occupation 
Region 
In  SMSA 
Proportion ma1 e 
Ma1 e 
Receive  incentive pay 
Establ i  shment 
size 
Mean  Coefficient or 
(in percent)  No.  of  Dummies 
Major  union  None  or mi  nor i  ty  66.5  -- 
affiliation  Clothing &  text.  29.3  0.103  (0.002) 
U.  garment  wkrs.  0.9  -0.050  (0.005) 
Other  unions  3.3  0.098  (0.003) 
Major pay  Indiv.  determin.  2.3  -- 
met  hod  Indiv.  piece rate  96.2  -0.104  (0.020) 
Group  piece rate  1.5  -0.169  (0.021) 




Dress  shirts 
Sports  shirts 
Ni  ghtwear 
Other 
None  53.9  -- 
Dress  shirts  6.8  -0.020  (0.002) 
Sports  shirts  13.6  0.004  (0.002) 
Ni  ghtwear  1.2  0.160  (0.005) 
Other  24.6  -0.004  (0.001) 
Production  Line  system  1.7  0.034  (0.004) 
met  hod  Bundle  system  42.7  -0.017  (0.001 
Prog.  bundle  54.8  -- 
Other  0.8  0.036  (0.006) 
Secondary  pay  pol i  cy 
R 
Source:  Tabulations  from BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table  A-5 
The  Effect  of  Establishment  Characteristics on  Log  Earnings 
Cotton and  Man-made  Textiles 
Characteri  sti  c  Level s 
Occupation 
In  SMSA 
Proportion male 
Ma1 e 
Receive  incentive pay 
Establishment  20-49 





2  500+ 
Major union 
affi  1  iation 
Major pay 
pol i  cy 
SIC 
Scope 
Mean  Coefficient or 
(in percent)  No.ofDummies 
None  or minority  77.8  -- 
Textile wkrs  union  14.7  0.027  (0.001) 
U.  textile wkrs.  7.4  0.040  (0.001) 
Other unions  0.1  0.029  (0.005) 
Indiv.  determin. 
Range-meri t 
Range-auto. 
Range-mer  &  auto. 
Single rate 
Indiv.  piece 
Indiv.  bonus 
Group  piece 
Group  bonus 
Fabric  >12"  cotton 




All 100  percent cotton 
M.  100  percent cotton 
A1 1 blend wlcot. 
M.  blend wlcot. 
A.  silk or synth. 
M.  silk or synth. 
Wool  blends 
Other Table  A-5,  continued 
The  Effect of Establ i  shment  Characteristics on  Log  Earnings 
Cotton and Man-made  Textiles 





Mi  11  type 
Mean  Coefficient or 
(in  percent)  No.  of  Dummies 
Carded  cotton  45.5  -- 
Combed  cotton  8.8  0.013  (0.001) 
Si  1  k  or man-made  f i  1 .  16.8  0.014  (0.002) 
Silk or man-made  spun  28.9  0.038  (0.001 ) 
Duck  1.3 
Sheetingc42"  1.9 
Sheeti  ng>42"  13.3 
Print.  cloth yarn  5.7 
Colored yarn  10.0 
Towe 1  s  8.0 
Napped  &  blankets  1  .O 
Fine cotton  2.0 
Other  woven  cottons  4.3 
Fi  lament  glats  2.7 
Filament  twisted  4.7 
Spun  man-made  17.0 
Man-made  wool  mixtures  0.1 
Silk &  mixtures  0.1 
Pi  1  e  &  uphol  stery  3.8 
Other  0.9 
Spi  nni  ng 
Weav i  ng 
Integrated 
Secondary pay policy  5 
Source:  Tabulations from BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table A-6 
The Effect of  Establ  i shment Characteristics on  Log  Earnings 
Fabricated Structural  Steel 





Ma1  e 
Receive incentive pay 





pol i  cy 
Process 
Mean  Coefficient or 
(in  percent)  No. of Dummies 
None or  mi  nor  i ty  23.1  -- 
Steel workers  23.8  0.073 (0.003) 
Bridge, str &  iron  39.0  -0.027  (0.004) 
Boi 1  ermakers  7.3  0.021  (0.007) 
Machinists  1.8  0.077 (0.005) 
Other unions  5.0  0.022  (0.004) 
Indiv. determin. 
Range-mer  i t 
Range-auto. 
Range-mer  i t &  auto. 
Single rate 
Indiv. piece rate 
Indiv. bonus 
Group  piece rate 
Group  bonus 
Commi  ssion 
No  joining  0.4  0.054 (0.014) 
Welding only  26.0  0.006  (0.002) 
Bolting only  68.6  0.095 (0.063) 
Mostly  bolting  0.0  0.048 (0.004) 
Other  4.3  0.217 (0.010) 
Mostly  welding  0.7  -- 
Secondary pay pol i  cy  5 
Source:  Tabulations from  BLS  Industry Wage Surveys. 